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Many intellectuals in the US and Asia believe that European social welfare 
policies should be a blueprint for action in their own countries. But those 
policies, financed by high taxes and costly mandates on business, are mainly 
re~ponsible for the enormous increase in European unemployment during the 
pas/ decade and a half This 'European disease ' is hardly a model for other 
nations. 
Gary Becker, 1992 Nobel laureate, Chicago University 
Business Week, 8 April 1996 
Yet, as the UK and western Europe contemplate adapting more to the 'American 
model' it is worth noticing a more menacing side. Hconomic inequality has 
continued to widen. All the rungs on the economic ladder are now further apart 
than a generation ago, and the space between them continues to spread. This 
widening of inequality leads to distress and misery for those at or near the 
bottom and anxiety for those in the middle. Left unchecked it could also 
undermine the stability and moral authority of the nation. 
Robert Reich, former U.S. Secretary oflabour, Brandeis University 
Financial Times, 3 March 1997 
1. Introduction (*) 
The reform of the welfare state is high on the political agenda in most European Union 
Member States. There is a general need to adjust social policies to new demographic, 
economic and social conditions while safeguarding their essential achievements1. 
Traditional solidarity and social protection objectives need to be better reconciled with 
economic efficiency and the long-term viability of welfare systems. Such a task raises 
difficult economic problems and requires hard political decisions. 
At the European Union level, the reform of social protection schemes, by increasing 
incentives to work, education and job creation, would allow to exploit more fully the 
potential benefits of the Internal Market. By contributing to fiscal consolidation, it 
would help to ensure the twin objectives of sound public finance and stable money. 
The combined result would be higher employment and economic welfare. 
This introductory paper, aims at focusing the debate at the European level. It 
highlights common problems and policy trends and examines some reforms that might 
contribute to tackling these problems. However, it does not enter into the specific 
problems of individual EU Member States. This represents a limitation of the study, 
since the problems and future prospects of national social security systems differ 
substantially. This situation is due to differences in the institutional set-up, budgetary 
situations, economic conditions, social attitudes, and demographic trends. Recent 
policies have also varied. Therefore, although European welfare states share some 
(*) The views expressed in this paper represent exdusively the positions of the authors and do not necessarily 
correspond to those of the European Commission. 'The authors wish to thank Dr. Heinrich Matthes for 
encouragement and support. They also thank for valuable comments Joly Dixon, Jan Schmidt, Jerome 
Vignon, Hans Wijkander, as well as the participants to a seminar organised by the Directorate-General for 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs to which a preliminary draft of the paper was 
presented. Maria Davi, Ingrid Godkin, Tracy Kebble, Cecilia Mulligan and Rui Pericao provided excellent 
editorial assistance. 
These issues are extensively considered also in several documents produced by the Directorate General for 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs. See European Commission (1993a, 1995a, 1995b, 
1997a). See also OECD (1988b, 1994a). 
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fundamental objectives, as well as some important challenges, they may require 
different institutions and reforms. 
In reviewing the pressures on European welfare states, it is important to distinguish 
essentially 'domestic' factors from increasing integration worldwide and in Europe. 
The former are dealt with in Section 2, while the latter will be considered in Section 3. 
Section 4 examines the reform process. It points to the reforms underway in many 
countries and examines some changes that could be implemented in the future. Section 
5 draws some conclusions. 
2. Achievements and challenges 
Backed by strong economic growth, social policies have contributed to making 
Europe, on the whole, a 'nice place to live' over the past half century. In a historical 
perspective, economic growth was exceptionally high in the 1950s and in the 1960s 
and the subsequent period up to the 1990s still compares favourably with previous 
experiences in most industrial countries (Maddison, 1995). The pillars of European 
social policy - pension, health and education systems, unemployment benefits, labour 
market regulations, the entitlements for the poor and the disabled and the tax systems 
needed to finance them - were largely put in place or greatly extended in the years of 
very high growth. 
By helping to distribute the benefits of growth, social policies have sustained a high 
level of social cohesion and favoured the research of co-operative solutions between 
social actors. However, as growth slowed down, a number of strains began to emerge, 
endangering welfare state achievements. Population ageing, changes in household 
structures, high unemployment, the negative effects of high tax rates on employment 
and rising concerns about European competitiveness in a globalised economy are 
adding to the pressure on social programmes throughout the EU. 
This section examines the achievements and challenges facing the welfare state in 
Europe2. It begins with a brief review of the social achievements and the economic 
rationale of welfare systems, with particular emphasis on the comparison between the 
EU and North America. It then analyses two major problems that call into question the 
long run sustainability of European social programmes, namely expenditure pressures 
and negative incentives in the labour market. 
2.1 Why the welfare state? Social achievements and economic rationale 
2 As already pointed out in the introduction, it should be stressed that the social protection systems of EU 
Member States are not homogeneous. According to Rhodes (1996), at least four models can be identified: 
the Scandinavian Model (high degree of universality and institutionalisation), the Bismarckian Model 
(labour market-based solutions, social insurance arrangements), the Liberal Anglo-Saxon Model (flat rate 
provisions, extensive means testing), the Southern Model (protection for regular workers, lack of general 
safety net, role of family in redistribution). On the specific features of the Southern Model see also Ferrera 
(1996). On the issue of convergence of European social protection systems toward a common model see 
Chassard and Venturini (1995) and Grahal and Teague (1996). 
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This section examines three related questions: the relative effectiveness of European 
welfare states in limiting poverty and inequality, their justification in terms of 
economic efficiency, and the relationship between welfare state and economic 
performance. 
2.1.1 Combating poverty and discrimination - One of the greatest achievements of the 
welfare state is the extent to which it has reduced the incidence of poverty, by 
preventing individuals and households from falling below a minimum income level, 
and promoted social integration, by making merit goods available to every citizen 
irrespective of socio-economic status. In order to evaluate the achievements of the 
European social protection system, it is interesting to compare Europe with North 
America, which has followed a rather different approach3. 
A more developed system of social protection has allowed Europe to combat poverty 
and discrimination in a much more effective way than the US. As shown in Table 1, 
not only has Europe, on the whole, a lower incidence of 'primary poverty' (i.e., 
poverty before taxes and transfers), but benefit and tax systems are more effective in 
alleviating it than in North America4. The countries with the lowest levels of poverty 
and, more in general, income inequality, tend to be also those with the greatest degree 
of social protection for the population of working age (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997). The difference between Europe and the US is even more striking if one focuses 
on groups most at risk of poverty, namely large families and lone-parent families. 
Child poverty is also particularly high in the US: about one American child in five 
lives in poverty. This percentage is significantly higher than those recorded in 
European countries (Coder et al., 1989; Forster, 1993). 
Other indicators, beside poverty incidence, also point to more serious social 
integration problems in the US. While in EU Member States nearly all citizens are 
entitled to health insurance, in the United States about 15% of those under 65 years of 
age have no insurance coverage (OECD, 1992a). Most individuals included in this 
group live in a precarious health care situation and receive low quality health care. 
Also, the share of the American population serving prison sentences is much higher 
(from eight to fifteen times) than in any EU country5. 
3 
4 
5 
For a comparative analysis of the development of the welfare state in Europe and the US, see Flora and 
Heidenheimer ( 1981) See also Emerson ( 1988). 
A caveat is in order when assessing the effectiveness of the welfare states in reducing inequality: the 
standard approach, comparing the distribution of net income with the distribution of income before taxes 
and transfer, fails to take into account behavioural responses to taxation and social transfers that are likely 
to result in pre-transfer and pre-tax income being more unequally distributed than it would be in the absence 
of redistributive policies (for example, relatively generous pension benefits inducing people to withdraw 
from work and hence forego market income earlier than would otherwise be the case). The magnitude of 
these feedback effects is the object of considerable controversy, even if they do not seem to be anY'where as 
large so as to negate the effect of redistribution. Moreover, the intensity of the welfare state redistributive 
effort cannot be plausibly taken as independent from other factors affecting income distribution (for 
example, trade unions' strength). These factors will tend to reduce the inequality of market outcomes and at 
the same time increase the intensity of redistribution (Pedersen, 1994 ). 
In 1990, 0.52% of the US adult male population was in prison. Overall, in the US 6.6% of the work-force 
was under supervision of the criminal justice system (in prison, on probation or parole) in 1993. Moreover, 
the prison population has been increasing by nearly 9% a year since the 1980s so that "at current rates, in 
the year 2000 the US will have a larger share of male in working age imprisoned or long-term unemployed 
than Europe will have long-term unemployed on the dole" (Freeman 1995b, p. 70). 
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The better performance of Europe compared to North America, on social grounds, is 
confirmed by data on trends in poverty and on the individual duration of poverty. In 
the US, the share of population under the official poverty line has increased by over 
three percentage points since the early 1970s (Haveman, 1996). In Europe, by contrast, 
the overall incidence of poverty has remained generally stable, even if a number of 
countries have seen an overall increase in (post-tax and transfer) income inequality 
since the 1980s, while changes in the opposite direction have been rare. 
Longitudinal analyses confirm that, while there is considerable movement in and out 
of poverty, "a rapid escape (after one year) from financial poverty seems more likely 
in countries with low poverty rates (like the Netherlands and Sweden) than in 
countries with high poverty rates (like Canada and the United States). In other words, 
there appears to be a marked inverse relationship between the incidence of poverty and 
escape rates" (Cantillon, 1996)6. Moreover, according to Gramlich (1989), in the 
United States the spatial concentration of poverty is high and increasing 7. 
Table 1 
Incidence of poverty in the EU and North America: Sen poverty measure (a) 
(non elderly families - percentage points) 
before taxes and transfers after taxes and transfers 
all large lone-parent all large lone-parent 
Germany (1984-85) 9.8 9.6 37.1 2.8 4.3 12.8 
France (1984) 10.8 24.1 27.8 4.3 3.5 8.5 
Italy (1986) NA NA NA 3.9 NA NA 
UK (1986) 18.4 28.4 61.2 5.1 8.5 9.0 
Austria (1984-85) NA NA NA 2.1 NA NA 
Belgium (1985) 8.7 11.7 27.2 2.1 2.3 8.0 
Denmark (1992) 14.6 NA NA 3.1 NA 1.0 
Ireland (1987) 19.8 23.8 38.1 5.9 6.7 13.8 
Netherlands (1987) 11.7 9.9 44.4 2.0 4.1 6.6 
Sweden (1987) (b) 13.3 11.3 28.2 6.7 1.2 2.0 
EU (c) 13.2 17.0 37.7 4.4 4.4 8.7 
us (1986) 13.0 24.0 42.9 10.0 19.1 29.9 
Canada (1987) 12.0 16.6 43.6 7.1 8.5 21.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: adapted from OECD ( 1995c ). 
(a) Sen index wmbines the share of persons in households with income below 50% of median income (low-income 
rate), the severity of poverty as measured by the diflerence in income of poor relative to the poverty line (average 
low-income gap) and the dispersion of income between the very poor and the not-so-poor (proxied by the Gini 
coefficient). The value of the index lies between O (no poverty) and 1 (incomes of the poor clustered around zero). 
(b) As pointed out by OECD (1995c), Sweden may overestimate the number of poor families as it considers 
persons over 18 living with their parents as independent households. 
( c) Unweighted average of available data, excluding incomplete cases. 
Data on the incidence of poverty over time are consistent with the much higher rise in 
earnings inequality in the US than in ( continental) Europe since the 1970s, and with 
6 
7 
Similar conclusions are reached by Duncan et al, (1993). According to this study, upward mobility is 
similar in Europe and the US. 
The share of the population living in areas defined as poor, according to strict definitions, rose from about 
0.5% in 1970 to about 1.5% of the population in 1980 with further subsequent increases; poor areas aL:count 
for more than 12% of the poor population. 
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the finding that the probability of moving upwards ( and downwards) in the earnings 
distribution over time does not increase with the degree of earning dispersion (OECD, 
1996b). Increased earnings inequality (among men) has probably been the most 
important factor behind rising income inequality in industrial countries since the 
1980s. 
Studies comparing indicators of socio-economic mobility suggest that countries with 
the most developed welfare states show also a lower degree of inequality in the long 
run. Calculating indicators of the inequality of income - such as the Gini coefficient -
over a multi-year period instead of over a single year tends to reduce inequality, but 
leaves the United States markedly more unequal than other countries on all measures 
of income (Aaberge et al., 1996). Studies measuring the correlation of long-run 
economic status between father and son tend to suggest that the United States (and 
Britain) have relatively low economic and social mobility (that is, relatively high 
correlation between father's and son's position in earnings distribution) compared to 
Germany and the Nordic countries (Bjorklund, 1996). In other words, empirical 
research does not seem to support the view that there is a trade-off between 'static' 
and 'dynamic' equality, whereas greater equality of opportunities can be bought at the 
price of higher inequality of outcomes. 
Cross-country comparisons of poverty and inequality typically refer to relative income 
differences, as countries differ substantially in terms of (average) per-capita income. 
However, recent calculations show that "low income" persons8 living in the United 
States are poorer, in terms of absolute purchasing power, than similarly situated 
persons in each of other 13 industrial countries, in spite of the clear advantage of the 
United States in terms of average and median per capita income (Gottschalk and 
Smeeding, 1997). 
2.1.2 Reducing social risks and promoting economic change - Viewing the welfare 
state, and more specifically the extensive European social protection systems, mainly 
in terms of poverty relief and, more generally, promoting equity would be a mistake 
not only on economic, but also on historical grounds. Indeed, the development of 
public transfer systems in most industrial countries was related not so much to the 
fight against poverty, per se, as to the general objective of providing security against 
the risk and hazards of life (Atkinson, 1993)9. 
Failures of private insurance markets - From an efficiency point of view, there is a 
strong case for government intervention to provide social insurance against risks 
which private insurance cannot adequately cover. A large body of theoretical literature 
has analysed the conditions under which private insurance markets fail. Its main 
conclusions with respect to welfare provisions can be summarised as follows (Barr 
1992 and 1993): 
8 
9 
"Low income" persons are defined as individuas in the bottom decile of the income distribution, with 
incomes calculated using the household as unit of aggregation and weighting units by the numbers of 
persons in the household. 
As pointed out by Varian (1980), redistributive systems can also be interpreted in terms of insurance, if the 
interests of the unborn are taken into consideration. If agents are risk-averse and "luck" determines the 
likelihood of being born in a wealthy or a poor family, a system guaranteeng a certain degree of equality 
may be preferred on insurance grounds. 
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a) Adverse selection and moral hazard problems may prevent private insurance 
from covering some risks. For instance, this applies to important medical risks, 
where the insurer cannot readily distinguish between high-risk and low-risk 
individuals. In this case a private market solution would fail to materialise if the 
low risks are free to opt out. While compulsory membership, making possible a 
pooling solution, may avoid the worst effects of adverse selection, moral hazard 
problems may require more extensive public intervention, such as the 
introduction of a social insurance scheme. More specifically, the powers of 
compulsion of the state are necessary to monitor and penalise the behaviour of 
individuals influencing the risk against which they are insured. This applies to 
unemployment insurance that cannot be provided by the market even for the 
'best' risks. 
b) Private insurance requires a predictable number of winners and losers over a 
given period of time: it cannot cope with common shocks - in which uncertainty 
concerns aggregate and not just individual outcomes - or with events 
characterised by unpredictable probabilities. Inflationary and other 
macroeconomic shocks are examples of such problems. 
c) Social insurance can supplement market demand when non-insurance by the 
individual imposes costs on others, such as in health care or provision for the 
aged. 
A social insurance system covering the entire population may also enjoy significant 
cost advantages, in terms of economies of scale and scope, over competing private 
insurance schemes. As the failures of private insurance markets typically imply an 
inability to tailor premiums to individual risks, social insurance will tend to contain an 
element of redistribution from good risks to bad risks. Compulsory membership allows 
governments to engage in redistribution according to equity or other objectives. 
How can the efficiency effects of the welfare state be assessed? 
If protection against risk, in alternative and/or in the absence of private insurance, is 
recognised as an essential function of the welfare state, an economic evaluation of the 
welfare state should focus on the effects of the increased security. Bearing in mind that 
risk is an unwanted activity (individuals will require an increasing compensation for 
taking more risk), the effects can be seen both from the production and the 
consumption side. 
From the production side, risk-taking can be considered as a 'factor of production'. Up 
to a certain point, risk can be transformed into higher income, as, for example, when 
an enterpreneur invests in a new market or a worker prepares for a new job. By 
reducing the amount of risk associated with any given activity, social insurance 
induces individuals to take up income opportunitites that they might have otherwise 
foregone and therefore can increase welfare for society as a whole (Sinn, 1994 and 
1995). 
From the consumption side, the effects of increased security can be seen in terms of 
added 'peace of mind' for a given expected income. Under certain assumptions, these 
effects can be quantified. On the basis of data on German and American households 
for the period 1983-1986, and assuming an income utility function with constant risk 
aversion, Bird (1995) calculates that the welfare cost of risk (that is, the amount that 
individuals would be willing to pay in exchange for securing their income at their 
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expected level) corresponds to 5.4% of disposable income in Germany and 8.5% in the 
US. This reflects the higher protection against income fluctuations available in 
Germany compared to the US. According to the study, tax and transfers reduce income 
risk by 43% in Germany and 21% in the US. 
In assessing the role of the state in the provision of social protection, one should also 
be aware that total level of spending on welfare services in industrial countries is not 
greatly influenced by whether expenditure is undertaken by the government or the 
private sector. For example, the difference in spending on welfare services between 
the US and the Scandinavian countries is much more limited when both public and 
private spending are taken into account. Specifically, total spending is 35% of GDP in 
Sweden and 28% in the US. The difference between the two countries becomes even 
smaller if one considers the amount of private spending on social protection plus taxes 
as a share of total expenditure by private households: in 1990 this attained 41.2% in 
Sweden and 39.6% in the US (Esping-Andersen, 1996). 
The case of health care is particularly noteworthy. The US health system is much more 
expensive than the European systems. While in 1991 in most EU Member States total 
expenditure for health (public plus private) was in the 6.5 to 9 per cent range, in the 
US it was about 13.4 per cent of GDP (OECD, 1994a). In spite of that, the US system 
does not seem to fare better in terms of the final output, that is the health status of the 
population. Moreover, US public expenditure levels are close to European levels (5.9 
per cent of GDP in 1991 for the US), but, as already mentioned, the US system does 
not ensure that all citizens are entitled to health insurance (OECD, 1992a). 
Welfare state and economic growth - If, to some extent, social protection can be 
considered as a factor of production, existing social protection systems need not imply 
negative consequences on output and growth. Historically, not only did the 
development of the welfare state actually accompany unprecedented economic growth 
in Europe, but also the two developments were long seen as mutually reinforcing 
rather than in contrast. Specifically, the welfare state was seen as strengthening 
economic performance, because of two widely shared perceptions: the stabilising 
effect of social transfers on the economic cycle and the positive contribution of social 
insurance to workers adjusting to economic change. More recently, the perceived 
relationship between economic efficiency and. social justice has become more 
problematic and the welfare state has increasingly come under attack as being 
detrimental to economic performance (Pfaller et al., 1991; Boyer, 1991; Snower, 
1996a). 
The relationship between income distribution and growth illustrates these 
controversies. The topic has recently been the subject of considerable academic 
interest 1°, but the results are not clear-cut. Some studies conclude that inequality in the 
distribution of (pre-tax) personal income has a significant negative effect on growth, 
both in developing and developed countries (Persson and Tabellini, 1994). Inequality 
would reduce growth by feeding redistributive conflicts. According to other studies, 
once country-specific effects are removed, there is no discernible effect of pre-tax 
inequality on growth (Foister and Trofimov, 1996). Both groups of studies indicate 
that the effects of social transfers on growth are negative. Yet another set of findings 
10 For recent reviews of economic research on the subject, see Atkinson (1995) and Agell et al. (1997). See 
also Benabou ( 1996 ). 
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suggests that countries with larger transfer programmes tend to grow faster (Sala-i-
Martin, 1996). 
This section has illustrated that European welfare states have been relatively effective 
in limiting poverty and inequality and that their existence is also consistent with 
economic efficiency considerations. Moreover, it has been shown that the relationship 
between welfare state and economic performance is more ambiguous that many seem 
to believe 11 . This broadly positive assessment of the welfare state does not necessarily 
imply that the present size and structure of European social protection systems are in 
any way optimal, or that the present efficiency and equity objectives could not be 
achieved with a leaner welfare state. Nor does this assessment imply that the present 
structure is the best suited to tackle future economic and social challenges. It only 
implies that, in outlining reforms of the European social protection systems, one 
should be careful in safeguarding its most important achievements (see Section 4). 
2.2 Pressures for change 
Today's economy and society are dramatically different from those at the time in 
which modern welfare states were established. A snapshot of the demographic and 
other structural changes that have affected Europe over the past three decades is 
provided in Table 2. The most evident implications of these changes on the working 
and the sustainability of the welfare state are related to budgetary and labour market 
imbalances 12. 
2.2.1 Budgetary strains - Over the period 1970-1994, the ratio of social protection 
expenditure to GDP in the EU increased from 19 per cent to 28.5 per centB. In most 
Member States social protection expenditure now represents more than a quarter of 
GDP and about half of public expenditure. 
To some extent, the increase in welfare spending reflects the rise in European living 
standards: "after all these welfare services are not inferior goods, the demand for them 
rises as peoples' incomes and wealth increases" (Orszag and Snower, 1997). However, 
this trend in spending, which has already contributed to substantial increases in tax and 
contribution rates, cannot continue indefinitely. Reforms are urgently required to 
check expenditure growth, which is fuelled by several factors common to most 
industrial countries: population ageing, changes in household structure, high 
unemployment and cost increases. 
II 
12 
13 
As suggested by Atkinson (1997), research is likely to yield more definite conclusions at disaggregate level. 
These issues are extensively examined in European Commission (1995b, 1997a). See also Grahal and 
Teague ( 1996). 
The estimate for 1994 does not include Austria, Finland and Sweden. That for 1970 also excludes Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. See Eurostat (1996). 
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Table 2 Demography, household structure and the labour market in the EU 
Life expectancy at birth (number of years): 
males 
females 
Life expectancy at 65 (number of years): 
males 
females 
Total fertility rate 
(number of children for each woman) 
Incidence of single-parent households (%) 
Incidence of one-person households (%) 
Number of divorces / 1000 inhabitants 
Unemployment rate (%) 
Workers on temporary contracts(%) (c): 
males 
females 
Workers on part-time contracts(%) (c): 
Social expenditure/ GDP(%) 
males 
females 
1960 
69. l(a) 
75.3(a) 
2.6 
7 
14 
0.5 
2.4 
4 
6 
22 
19.0(a) 
1990 
73.7 
79.8 
14.6 
18.4 
1.5 
16 
27 
1.6 
10.9(b) 
8 
11 
3 
28 
27.5(d) 
Sources: DG II database, EUROSTAT (1995), European Commission (1995b and 1995c). Data refer to 
EUR15. 
(a) Data refer to 1970. 
(b) Data refer to 1996. 
(c) Data refer respectively to 1975 and 1991. 
(d)Datareferto 1993. 
Population ageing - Changes in birth rates, life expectancy and migration flows are 
changing size as well as structure of the population of EU Member States (European 
Commission, 1995c and 1996c, and Eurostat, 1996). The increase in the old-age 
dependency ratio, which is reaching historically unprecedented levels, is one of the 
most evident and important trends. 
In the coming decades, demographic changes will affect public budgets, through their 
effects on the demand for public services and transfers and, indirectly, through their 
effects on macroeconomic and structural factors14. Public health and pension systems 
will bear much of this pressure, since their expenditure is highly dependent on the 
population age structure. According to national pension expenditure projections, over 
14 The economic effects uf ageing have been examined by an extensive economic literature, see Borsch-Supan 
(1991 and 1993), Cutler et al. (1990), Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) and OECD (1988a, 1988c, 1996a). 
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the period 1995-2030, under unchanged policy, the ratio of public pension expenditure 
to GDP in the EU will increase on average by 3 to 4 percentage points15. 
Substantial pressures are expected also on expenditure for health care (Leibfritz et al., 
1995) and services for the elderly 16, especially in the light of the growing number of 
very old citizens with costly need for care. Although the expected decline in the share 
of young people in total population might reduce the demand for public services and 
transfers in other areas - namely basic education, maternity and child allowances -
there is a widespread consensus that overall demographic changes tend to increase 
public expenditure and produce negative effects on public budgets (see, Heller et al., 
1986; OECD, 1988a; Leibfritz et al., 1995; Franco and Munzi, 1997). These effects 
will vary considerably across the EU according to different national demographic 
trends and public expenditure structure. 
Changes in household structure - Family structures are rapidly changing. Households 
are becoming more fragmented (see Table 2). The increase in the number of lone-
parents and, more generally, the reduction in the size of households, tend to increase 
the proportion of households facing difficult economic conditions and the demand for 
welfare state services and transfers (OECD, 1990a and 1994b). The impact of 
changing family patterns is visible in most industrial countries through the relative 
increase in the social assistance or safety net component of the welfare state, 
particularly concerning young people and lone parents17. Household fragmentation 
tends to justify greater individualisation of welfare benefits, also on grounds of 
horizontal equity ( equal treatment for equal situation), which in turns implies higher 
spending. 
High and persistent unemployment - Unemployment rates in Europe are considerably 
higher than those recorded in past decades: in 1996 the average rate in the EU (about 
11 %) was almost 5 times higher than that of the 1960s (see Table 2). Unemployment 
spells are also much longer than in the past (see Section 2.2.2). High unemployment 
increases public expenditure on unemployment benefits and social assistance and 
reduces tax revenues. lt also tends to increase pension expenditure, as the actual 
retirement age falls under the pressure of demands for early retirement or disability 
pensions. As a consequence, the effectiveness of reforms, aimed at cutting pension 
expenditure by increasing statutory retirement age, is reduced. 
Cost pressures - The production of services directly provided or financed by the 
welfare state is subject to the 'Baumol disease of personal services'. As they consist 
mainly of personal services whose productivity grows slowly - because they are 
essentially provided through labour input - the cost of welfare state services is bound 
to increase relative to the cost of other commodities. This implies that in order to 
15 
16 
17 
The e~1imate refers to the projections carried out in the 11 EU Member States that produce projections up to 
the year 2030. Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal are not included. See Franco and Munzi (1996). 
This issue is also covered in Kopits (1997) and Thomas (1997). 
According to Progi10s ( 1995), the contribution rate required to finance the German long-term care insurance 
scheme is likely to increase from 1 per cent in 1995 to 1.7-1.8 per cent in 2010 and 2.3-2.6 per cent in 2040. 
In the early 1990s, a significant proportion of the population was relying on social assistance in all 
European countries: from 2% in Portugal and in Luxembourg, to about 10% in Finland and in France, up to 
15% in Ireland and the United Kingdom (van Ginneken, 1995). However, as social assistance systems 
wmplement in various ways social insurance systems, cross-country institutional differences are too great 
to allow for accurate international comparisons. 
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satisfy a rising demand, society should allocate a rising share of national income to the 
welfare state ( Snower, 1993 and 1994b). While globalisation of services and 
intelligence-intensive technological progress may, in principle, help in keeping costs 
down in some services, recent experience seems to show that these developments also 
entail 'product innovation', which stimulates an even greater demand on the part of the 
public (e.g. in health care). 
In conclusion, given the expected changes in demographic structure and the other 
factors mentioned above, the preservation of present benefit levels and eligibility rules 
will require a substantial increase in national resources allocated to social security 
systems. Alternatively, the stabilisation of social expenditure will entail severe cuts in 
benefit levels and substantial restrictions in eligibility. Both these options are difficult: 
the first implies persuading citizens to pay higher taxes and accepting higher 
disincentives effects; the second implies a revision of present objectives and a scaling 
down of citizens' expectations. 
2.2.2 Labour market problems - The labour market and the welfare state are closely 
linked. While labour market changes affect the demand for benefits and the sources to 
fund them, tax and benefit structures influence the behaviour of individuals in the 
labour market (see, for instance, OECD, 1995b). Demand and supply of labour are 
also affected by employment protection legislation, which can be considered an 
integral part of the European welfare state 'package' 18. 
The changing relationship between welfare state and labour market - Present 
European welfare systems - based on budgetary transfers to support workers during 
spells of unemployment, and job security legislation to ensure a relatively high degree 
of employment stability - were conceived in a situation of low and essentially cyclical 
unemployment; standardised production carried out by a relatively unskilled 
workforce; collective bargaining arrangements with various degrees of centralisation 
and compression of wage structures; and one breadwinner per family (see, e.g. Esping-
Andersen, 1996). In this context, it was natural to have welfare services and transfers 
largely concentrated in the first and last part of a worker's life (covering basic 
education and retirement pensions) and in providing social insurance for temporary 
unemployment spells. 19 
The current and foreseeable features of the economic environment are gradually 
undermining all these elements. 
In the EU there are about 18 million people unemployed. In most countries 
unemployment has been increasing from one economic cycle to the next. According to 
surveys, a further 9 million people are not registered as unemployed, but would be 
willing to sign up for a job if labour market prospects improve. The average 
participation rate in Europe is around 60%, compared with more than 70% in the US. 
18 
19 
Some relevant issues are examined in the studies im;luded in Gual ( 1996). 
Significant differences exist between the main type of social protection systems (see note 2). The 
Scandinavian Model tt:nds to allocate a relatively large fraction of social protection outlays to the working-
age population, including benefits and services to encourage job search among the unemployment and 
support for lone-parent work seekers and secondary earners. The other models, and in particular tl1e 
Mediterranean model, tend to concentrate social benefits on fue elderly population. 
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Furthermore, half of the unemployed have been out of work for more than a year and 
half of them have low educational levels. 
Mass production is quickly being replaced by flexible, customer-oriented production: 
traditional taylorist factories are giving way to 'holistic' firms characterised by more 
horizontal structures. As argued by Lindbeck and Snower (1996), the premium on 
workers' versatility, entailed by the new firm organisation, is leading to a widening 
dispersion of wages within seemingly identical workers groups, over and above the 
inequality-enhancing effect of skill-biased technological progress. This process, by 
increasing the importance of 'personalised' wage incentives, is putting strain on 
collective bargaining arrangements, based on the principle of 'equal pay for equal 
work'. The weight of services, accounting for more than half of private employment 
and continuously increasing, adds to the difficulties of collective bargaining, as 
production units tend to be smaller in the tertiary sector. The reduction in firm size, 
evident since the 1970s even in manufacturing, works in the same direction. 
The one-breadwinner-per-household model, which dominated in the 1950s and 1960s? 
is being progressively eroded. As documented by Webb (1995), in the UK, where this 
process has gone relatively further, in the period 1961-63 almost 7 households out of 
10 included only one worker. This share has collapsed to just above 3 out of 10 at the 
beginning of the 1990s. On the contrary, the share of the two-worker household has 
increased over the same period from 28% to 55%. This process has gone hand in hand 
with a rising polarisation of work distribution: the share of households without people 
working increased from 4% at the beginning of the 1960s to 13% in the early 1990s. 
At the same time, the second earner is often a part-timer, with a less stable job, being 
paid a relatively low wage (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996). 
Unemployment compensation - Unemployment benefits and unemployment 
assistance fulfil the basic objectives of, respectively, social insurance against loss of 
income due to (involuntary) job termination and social assistance, ensuring a 
minimum living standard. As explained above, the provision of public unemployment 
insurance can be justified on efficiency grounds, since private unemployment 
insurance may not be feasible due to information asymmetries in the insurance market. 
Unemployment compensation can also bring economic benefits in terms of more 
efficient job matching, as job-seekers can spend more time on searching the job 
openings in which they will be more productive, and increase human capital 
accumulation by workers facing uncertain demand for firm-specific services. 
However, unemployment compensation and, more generally, tax and transfer 
programmes, are perceived as having potentially serious distortionary effects on the 
working of the labour market, resulting in an increase in the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment. More specifically, high level and duration of benefits can reduce 
search effort on the part of the unemployed, work effort on the part of the employed 
and increase the bargaining power of insiders. In particular, at the low end of the wage 
scale, the effect of net transfers may be such so as to remove any pecuniary incentive 
for the jobless to become employed ('unemployment trap') or for the low-paid to 
increase work effort ('poverty trap'). These effects will generally result in an increase 
in the reservation wage. Furthermore, taxes and charges levied to finance 
unemployment compensation and the welfare state will tend to decrease the real wage 
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that businesses can afford to pay to workers at any level of employment, thereby 
affecting negatively the demand for labour.20 
Are these potential effects borne out by empirical evidence? Attention should be 
drawn to the following pointsz': 
a) 
b) 
The estimated effects of the levels of benefits on the length of unemployment are 
relatively modest ( estimated elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits 
below one) according to a number of studies. In some European countries, 
replacement ratios are high and, as a consequence, the disincentives potentially 
important, mainly for low wage and 'fringe' workers as well as families with 
children. 
The duration of benefit is generally estimated to have a significant effect on the 
length of unemployment22. 
c) National institutional characteristics can considerably influence the effect of 
unemployment compensation: the tighter the administration of benefits, 
especially concerning job-search requirements, the lower the effect. 
d) Unemployment compensation does not only affect the probability of leaving 
unemployment for employment but the whole range of labour market transitions. 
For example, a cut in benefits (or a tightening of eligibility requirements) will 
tend to reduce unemployment also by increasing withdrawals from the labour 
force (or participation in government training schemes). 
In conclusion, although the recent surge in unemployment has gone hand in hand with 
a reduction in the generosity of benefit systems and it is difficult to attribute the bulk 
of European unemployment to benefit-induced disincentives, welfare systems and 
their financing appear to aggravate unemployment and have a significant effect on its 
persistence. The effects of benefits on work incentives become greater if account is 
taken of the corresponding increase in the tax burden (i.e. by considering the marginal 
effective tax rates), with taxes on earned or labour income being the most damaging. 
This applies especially to low-skilled workers. 
Labour market regulations - The general case for relaxing labour market regulations, 
for example pertaining to hiring and firing workers, is similar to the case for 
streamlining unemployment compensation, and is subject to analogous qualifications. 
Besides possibly increasing the equilibrium rate of unemployment by raising the 
power of insiders, employment protection is generally supposed to reduce the speed of 
20 
21 
22 
Implicit in this reasoning is a model of unemployment as equilibrium outcome in imperfectly competitive 
labor and prodm:t markets (Phelps 1994b ). The equilibrium employment rate, and by residual 
unemployment, is represented by the intersection of a wage-setting curve and a labour demand curve. The 
wage-setting curve represents the effect of etliciency wage considerations ( or, alternatively, bilateral 
bargaining between !inns and unions). It is upward-sloping as the premium over the market-clearing wage 
is increasing in the employment rate. The labour demand curve depicts firms' optimal price and 
employment decision given the wage they face. It is downward-sloping as firms' unit costs are typically 
increasing in the wage paid economy-wide (or, alternatively, because firms set prices as a mark-up to 
marginal costs). 
See Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Bionda! and Pearson (1995) for a survey of the literature. 
According to some studies (referring to the US situation), for a given expenditure cut in unemployment 
benefits, a reduction in duration has as much as twice the effect of a reduction in level (Katz and Meyer, 
1990). 
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adjustment of (un)employment to its long-run level following a shock (Jackman et al., 
1996). 
At the same time, some forms of labour market rigidity can be rationalised as 
substitutes for insurance that the markets cannot provide23. Employment stability 
provisions can also be seen as enhancing investment in match-specific human capital, 
which would not be undertaken in a laissez faire world for fear of opportunistic 
behaviour (Alogoskoufis et al., 1995). Finally, it is also argued that the monopsony 
power of employers - the power to restrict labour demand in order to push down 
wages - is important and labor market regulations are required to restrain its use 
(Gregg and Manning, 1996). 
To the extent that both labour market regulations and welfare provisions respond to 
the same type of market failures, they can also be seen as substitutes. It has been 
observed that "labour market policy regimes work like communicating pipelines" 
(Schmid, 1995, p. 57): the relative underdevelopment of one set of policies tends to 
result in others being put in place to replace it. Thus, for example, the relatively high 
degree of labour market rigidities in some countries may be related to the limited 
development of the unemployment compensation system. 
At the same time, it must be recognised that current labour market rigidities in Europe 
are too pervasive to be justified on efficiency grounds alone. Efficiency considerations 
would suggest compensating uninsurable losses through taxes and transfers rather than 
by placing constraints on the allocation and/or price oflabour. Even more than welfare 
provisions, therefore, labour market rigidities probably call for a 'political economy' 
rationale, i.e., one that explicitly recognises the need for policies to be sustained by 
sufficiently strong coalitions24. 
Views on the importance of regulations on labour market outcomes differ among 
economists. Empirically, it has proved difficult to establish the existence of a 
significant long-term effect of specific regulations on labour market adjustments 
(Blank and Freeman, 1993). Restrictions on hiring and firing, by increasing turnover 
costs, tend to make employment and unemployment more resistant to cyclical 
fluctuations. The result is a reduction in the variability of employment, but not 
necessarily the average level of employment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). 
This 'neutral' view of the impact of labour market regulation on employment and 
unemployment has been challenged recently on the basis of a number of relatively 
new features of the economic environment in the industrialised world. Specifically: 
i) Hiring and firing costs result in a 'zone of inaction' following a demand shock. 
23 
24 
But if a large shake-out of labour does occur, for example in the case of a deep 
and prolonged recession as expercienced by many countries in the 1980s and in 
For example, in the presence of uncertainty over future product demand, it is eflicent for risk-averse 
workers and risk-neutral firms to opt for contracts with redundancy pay. Informational constraints about 
workers' productivity or demand conditions, or the simple possibility of firm bankruptcy, may then require 
some form of state intervention on firing costs (Booth, 1996). 
Thus, for example, minimum wage regulations, rnupled with restrictions on hiring and firing, can be 
interpreted as devices to increase the convergence of interests within the 'core' of employed workers at the 
expense of the 'periphery' of the unemployed and the workers with the highest qualification (Saint-Paul, 
1995a and 1995b ): wage compression tends to make the median voter richer relative to the average and job 
security tends to make the minority oflosers identifiable in advance. 
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the 1990s, a return of demand to its pre-shock state may be insufficient to restore 
employment to its earlier levels (Diaz and Snower, 1996). 
ii) Restrictions such as seniority rules, by treating workers as close substitutes for 
each other, may hamper the organisational innovations required by new 
technologies (Lindbeck, 1994c). 
iii) High turnover costs may reduce technological innovation and hence productivity 
and competitiveness in the long term. A country with regulations making the 
reallocation of labour very costly will tend to produce a lower share of 
innovative, but riskier, goods and have a relatively lower investment in R&D 
(Saint-Paul, 1996)25. 
In conclusion, a critical examination of labour market regulations would probably 
concur with the view that "existing legislation was better adapted to conditions in the 
past than to today's world with large macroeconomics disturbances, high and 
persistent unemployment, rapid structural change, great uncertainty, and increasing 
heterogeneity of jobs and workers" (Lindbeck, 1994c, p. 73). 
3. Implications of increasing economic integration 
European welfare states will also be affected by increasing economic interdependence. 
The deepening of integration worldwide and in Europe will intensify some of the 
pressure highlighted in the previous section and add some additional constraints. 
The implications on European welfare states of increasing integration can be analysed 
from three different standpoints: 
a) Increased factor and consumer mobility. 
b) Economic adjustments in an integrated economy. 
c) The quest for budgetary discipline. 
3.1 Factor and consumer mobility 
Economic integration increases the mobility of productive factors and may also 
increase the mobility of the consumers of social services. 
Factor mobility - Economic integration, which is expected to deepen in Europe after 
the introduction of the single currency, by stepping-up factor mobility, may increase 
revenue losses arising from the movement of tax bases towards countries applying 
lower tax rates. A situation of fiscal degradation could be made worse by fiscal 
competition among countries and regions, which might reduce tax rates in order to 
attract productive factors. These trends would primarily affect capital income taxation 
and corporate taxation, but labour and consumption taxes would also be influenced. 
25 This prediction is consistent with widespread - but largely anecdotal - evidence on the different type of 
R&D spending in Europe and in the US (more process innovation in the former, more product innovation in 
the latter). For an opposite view on the effects of labour market regulations on productivity, one may point 
to the widespread interpretation of the 'German model' according to which firms have been induced to 
invest heavily in productivity-enhancing technologies to cope with the high labour costs. In this approach, 
flexible labour markets, by leading to a fall in the price of low-skilled labour, may give rise to Snower's 
"low-skill, bad-job trnp" (Snower, 1994c). 
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The empirical research on the effects of tax degradation and competition on revenue 
trends in the EU Member States is still in its infancy (Hoeller et al., 1996). Although, 
over recent years, tax to GDP ratios have remained broadly constant, the distribution 
of the tax burden on different factors in the EU has changed substantially along lines 
consistent with fiscal degradation and competition. Over the period 1980-1994, while 
the implicit tax rate on employees' income has increased on average from 34.7 to 40.5 
per cent, the implicit rate on other productive factor income has declined from 44.1 to 
35.2 per cent (European Commission, 1996b). 
Future trends are also uncertain. Some economists take the view that, if unmitigated 
tax competition is allowed in the Internal Market, "the New York city effect will be 
the death of European welfare states" (Sinn, 1990). While this view is perhaps 
extreme, in a context of mobile tax bases and competition between jurisdictions, 
further increases in the tax to GDP ratios appear unlikely. Attempts to shift even 
further the burden of funding public expenditure on labour would reinforce the 
negative effects on employment highlighted above. 
The role of benefit-taxation (user charges, etc.) is bound to increase, while that of 
ability to pay taxation is likely to be restrained. An increasing share of revenue will 
come from taxpayers covering the cost of the specific services provided to them. To 
the extent that social protection provides insurance (rather than simply redistribute 
income), mobile but risk-averse workers will value it as a service. Therefore, while 
quasi-actuarial social insurance will survive labour market integration, social 
assistance will come under increasing pressure (Atkinson, 1992). Several recent 
pension reforms are moving this way (see Section 4.1), as well as the proposals by 
Foister and Orszag and Snower considered in Section 4.2.3. 
The gradual transformation of taxes into pure-benefit taxes seems a likely scenario 
particularly for the taxation of business, with firms increasingly 'shopping' across 
jurisdictions within the single market in search of the best tax and service package. 
Empirical evidence, based on the US experience, points to relatively low inter-regional 
(inter-state) elasticities of economic activity ( employment or value added) with respect 
to (aggregate) tax levels (between 0.2 and 0.6); however, elasticities become higher 
when public services are included in the analysis, and intra-regional (intra-state) 
elasticities are much higher (four times as much or more) than inter-regional ones. 
This suggests that, with other cost variables similar among different locations, taxation 
plays an important role in location decisions (Wasylenko, 1997). 
Consumer mobility - Increased economic integration may also increase the mobility of 
consumers of welfare state services. Citizens may have an incentive to move to 
countries that provide higher benefits and better services or they may demand services 
produced in other Member States. 
Welfare migration, which may put pressure towards lowering the level of services, is 
not likely to reach sizeable dimensions (Ermisch, 1991). In the United States, it is 
discernible, but not important. States are therefore able to keep different levels of 
benefits. Labour mobility in Europe, both across and within countries, is markedly 
lower than in the US. Hence, it is likely that also in the future European governments 
will be in a position to pursue tax and transfer policies according to national 
preferences. This conclusion is supported by the experience of Switzerland, a small 
country with a linguistically diverse population, where local authorities (cantons) are 
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responsible for a high (and increasing) share of government transfers (Begg et al., 
1993; Hoeller et al., 1996)26. 
An increasing number of citizens is also likely to demand services produced in other 
countries, without necessarily living there. This may apply particularly to health and 
insurance services27 . This trend would provide incentives to improve the quality of 
services and increase efficiency. In the long-run, it might also lead to some 
harmonisation of national social protection systems. 
3.2 Economic adjustment in an integrated economy 
Economic and monetary integration will affect the way European economies adjust to 
shocks. First, in EMU, the nominal exchange rate will not be available as an 
adjustment tool in the event of country-specific shocks. Second, globalisation and the 
Internal Market are likely to change the nature of shocks. Last but not least, the 
behaviour of wage and price setters is also likely to be affected. The functioning of the 
welfare state has important implications for the way these changes translate into 
employment/unemployment outcomes28. 
It is argued that in the short-term, following the occurrence of a given shock, the 
availability of the nominal exchange rate can enhance the effectiveness of the 
adjustment to the new equilibrium. Adverse country-specific shocks require a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate to avoid negative fluctuations in unemployment. 
If wages to do not adjust smoothly to the new conditions, a depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate can arguably work in 'front-loading' the required real exchange 
rate adjustment. This presupposes, however, that exchange rates tend to move 
predictably in response to macroeconomic imbalances. Experience and empirical 
evidence indicate that, in a world of free capital movements, exchange rates tend to be 
driven by financial considerations, which are unrelated to such macroeconomic 
imbalances. Empirical evidence also suggests that European countries are 
characterised by relatively a high degree of real wage rigidity - i.e. relative fast 
response of wages to prices changes coupled with relatively low sensitivity to 
unemployment. If wages react quickly to price rises, a nominal exchange rate 
depreciation is bound to be less effective in inducing an equivalent change in the real 
exchange rate and more likely to trigger an inflationary spiral. 
26 
27 
28 
Although cross-wuntry labour mobility is likely to remain low throughout the European Union for the 
foreseeable future, regional mobility (e.g. between the Nordic countries) may be expected to reach 
significant dimensions. Tentative conclusions can be drav.n from the experience of the integrated Nordic 
labour market (citizens of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have had the right to settle 
anywhere in the area without either residency or work pennits since 1954, Nordic immigrants are treated 
the same as native residents by the national authorities and information on work opportunities is shared 
across the area). Studies find that intra-Nordic migration is significantly responsive to real wage and 
unemployment differentials, with potential mobility being the strongest among the highest educated and tl1e 
largest disincentive etlect being the extensive safety net for the unemployed (Hutchinson and Kletzer, 
1995). At European level, in the future, some form of co-ordination of national benefit systems might be 
necessary in order to prevent individuals from adjusting their geographical location over their life cycle on 
the basis of specific features of benefit systems (Lindbeck, 1997). 
As to development of a Single Market in supplementary pensions, see European Commission ( 1997b ). 
For a discussion of acljustment under EMU, with particular reference to employment/unemployment 
outcomes, see Vifials and Jimeno ( 1996). 
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More generally, globalisation and higher trade integration are likely to have wider 
consequences for the 'dynamics' of European economies. More open and transparent 
markets may increase 'contestability' and spur organisational and technological 
innovation, thereby leading to a higher frequency of industry-specific shocks. 
Moreover, the Internal Market rules, coupled with a tough competition policy, will 
reduce the scope for defensive 'industrial' policies by member countries that have 
been intensively used in the past, in order to cushion negative shocks and preserve 
occupational levels. These effects, which cannot be tackled through nominal exchange 
rate variations, may require more frequent changes in relative wages and a smooth re-
allocation of labour across sectors and regions. 
At the same time, the competition-enhancing effects of economic integration are likely 
to impose more discipline on price and wage setters. This should mean both a more 
effective adjustment to shocks and a lower equilibrium level of unemployment. 
Welfare state provisions have mixed effects in this context: employment protection 
legislation may hamper the shift of labour resources from declining to rising 
industries; analogously, unemployment compensation, by reducing job-search activity 
and enhancing insiders' power, may increase real wage rigidity. However, social 
insurance, by easing the transition, can render reallocation more feasible. Other 
welfare state programmes (namely, training and active labour market policies, as well 
as housing policy) also play an important role in fostering labour mobility and 
industrial adjustment. 
Better 'mobility-friendly' welfare services, coupled with less rigid hiring and firing 
rules and an improvement of the conditionality of unemployment benefits (better 
incentives, job search requirement, etc.) would enhance labour markets' ability to 
respond to shocks. Although the 'mobility-oriented' revision of the welfare state 
should primarily involve labour market policies and unemployment benefits, all 
schemes should be re-examined. For instance, the obstacles to labour mobility arising 
from pension systems should be gradually removed (by reducing the segmentation of 
the system into different schemes or ensuring the portability of contributions). 
Housing policies should also be systematically reconsidered. 
3.3 The quest for budgetary discipline 
Solid budgetary discipline is an essential condition for the success of EMU. A sound 
budgetary position before joining the single currency and budgetary prudence once in 
EMU are at the core of the budgetary policy provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. 
It should be stressed that, as pointed out above, European budgetary trends would 
anyway require substantial corrections. The budgetary framework for EMU outlines 
policy changes that several countries would anyhow have implemented. In some cases, 
it may accelerate policy changes by increasing the pressure to take a more long-term 
view in evaluating the costs and benefits of different policies. 
Given that further increases in the ratio of tax revenues to GDP do not seem feasible, 
because of the implications of economic integration on revenues (Section 3 .1 ), future 
budgetary adjustments will have to be concentrated on expenditure items. Any 
correction of present expenditure trends will necessarily involve social protection 
expenditure, which represents about two thirds of public expenditure net of interest 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
payments in EU Member States and, for the reasons outlined in Section 2.2.1, tends to 
increase faster than other expenditure items. 
Over the next few years, pressure on welfare spending will be exerted by the further 
reduction of the deficit towards a balanced budget, as provided for by the Stability and 
Growth Pact29 . This implies that governments will have to run large primary surpluses 
in normal economic conditions. An indication of the size of the surpluses is provided 
by the amount of interest payments (an average expenditure of 5 percentage points of 
GDP is expected for 1997). 
Over a longer time span, further substantial policy changes will be required in order to 
maintain the 'close to balance' position, particularly after the year 2010, and to avoid 
that population ageing will determine unsustainable deficits and debt levels (Franco 
and Munzi, 1997). More specifically, action should be taken to offset the budgetary 
effects of the demographic changes outlined in Section 2.2.1. In the long-run, welfare 
state transfers may also have to compete with competitiveness-enhancing spending 
priorities, such as infrastructure investment, and may require a revision of their 
internal composition, with a greater concentration on education and human capital 
improvement. 
One point should be stressed. Although the 'close to balance' rule is introduced in 
connection with EMU, its implementation will also allow Member States to meet the 
worsening of the demographic situation after the year 2010 with smaller public debts 
and lower interest burdens. Governments will be forced to use the demographic 
'breathing-space' to meet on a sounder fiscal policy position the ageing of the baby-
boom generation. 30 
4. The reform process 
According to opinion polls, throughout the Union there is widespread support for the 
essential features of the welfare state: universal rights to basic health and educational 
services, support for poor, sick, unemployed and disabled citizens, and an adequate 
level of intergenerational redistribution guaranteed by the state. It is widely felt that 
reforms should not impair these achievements and fundamental features. 
However, the continuation of present social protection policies would require 
increases in tax rates that would negatively affect labour supply and unemployment, 
might have a negative impact on the long-term performance of European economies, 
and would conflict with the pressures towards lower tax rates stemming from 
economic integration and the globalisation of economic activities. Across Europe 
policy-makers are, therefore, confronted with the task of curbing expenditure growth 
while preserving the fundamental features of social protection systems and facing new 
needs, such as those of elderly citizens in long-term care and lone-parent families. 
29 
30 
TI1e 'close-to-balance· rule would allow Member States to retain budgetary stabilisers without going 
beyond the 3% threshold in the event of recession ( see, Buti et al., 1997). 
More specifically, part of the increase in pension and health expenditure determined by population ageing 
would be offset by a reduction in interest payments on the public debt. According to some preliminary 
estimates carried out in Franco and Munzi ( 1997), about half of the increase in public expenditure 
determined by population ageing in heavily indebted countries might be offset by the reduction in interest 
payments on public debt determined by the implementation of the 'close-to-balance' rule. 
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This section focuses on three specific aspects of the reform issue. First, it shows that 
the adjustment process of social policies to the new demographic and economic 
conditions is already underway, although it is far from completion. Then it considers 
three possible reform lines: the transition from Pay-As-You-Go (PA YG) to funded 
pension schemes, the shift from unemployment benefits towards employment 
subsidies and changes in the design of social protection strengthening their efficiency. 
Finally, it examines some aspects of the implementation of the reform process and 
points to the problems of welfare state retrenchment. 
4.1 Reforms are underway 
In most countries, present social policies are quite different from those implemented in 
previous decades 31 . The phase of extension of coverage and improvement of benefits 
is over, although in a few countries the lagged effects of past extensions and 
improvements are still affecting expenditure growth. 
This change is quite evident for pension ~ystems. Since the mid-eighties most pension 
schemes have been reformed in order to reduce pension expenditure. Major reforms 
were introduced in Austria (1985, 1988 and 1993), Germany (1989), Italy (1992 and 
1995), France (1993), Greece (1990 and 1992), Portugal (1993), Sweden (1994), the 
United Kingdom (1986, 1994). Reforms involve less generous benefit indexation 
rules, increases in standard retirement age, reductions in replacement rates, tightening 
of eligibility criteria for disability benefits and pension credits for years with limited or 
null contributions, curtailing or abolishing public sector employees' special pension 
benefits, lengthening of contribution periods required for pension eligibility. In several 
countries, reforms, by cutting eligibility and transfer ratios, 32 have brought the 
expected increases in the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP firmly below the 
expected increases of the old-age dependency ratio. Cost containment was just one of 
the objectives of the reforms, which also aimed at making the system more able to 
tolerate demographic change, more transparent in its distributive effects, and less 
distortive in its effects on individuals' choices. 33 
Health care ~ystems are also undergoing substantial changes, although the general 
pattern ofreform is less uniform (European Commission, 1995a; OECD, 1990b, 1994c 
and 1995a). This is due to substantial differences in the structure of national health 
care systems and the role of the public sector in the provision and financing of health 
care. While the principles of universality and equality in the access to services were 
not questioned, expenditure control has been pursued with a wide variety of 
instruments: tighter hospital budgets, restrictions on the supply of services (i.e., 
hospital beds, new entrants in medical education, new technologies), restrictions on 
the reimbursement of drugs (with negative and positive lists and reference price 
systems), increase in cost-sharing. Several reforms aimed at increasing efficiency in 
31 
32 
33 
For a description of recent reforms see European Commission (1993a, 1995a). 'The reforms recently 
undertaken and planned in France are extensively examined in Darnaud (1997) which also highlights the 
problems raised by their implentation. 
Respectively, the ratio of the number of pensions to the number of elderly citizens and the ratio of the 
average pension to the average wage. 
This applies particularly to the recent Italian and Swedish pension reforms, which share the same general 
objectives and main features. See respectively Artoni and Zanardi ( 1996) and Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs ( 1994 ). 
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the use of resources and quality of services by modifying incentives at the micro-level: 
giving patients more choice (Sweden), introducing competition within the public 
sector and between the public and the private sector (UK), separating the provision 
and the financing of services (UK), relying more on contracts as an instrument to 
allocate resources among providers, shifting responsibilities towards regional and local 
administrative levels (Finland, Italy). 
Unemployment benefits are also being reformed throughout the EU, with the emphasis 
on curbing expenditure growth and dependency on social protection. However, 
institutional changes in most Member States fall short of a radical overhaul of the 
current systems. Efforts have also been made to curb abuses. Eligibility criteria have 
been tightened, with stricter definitions of availability for work and tougher sanctions 
on those refusing to take up a job ( or a training course) applied in several countries 
(such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and the UK). The duration of benefits 
and/or replacement ratios have been reduced in an attempt to curb alleged work 
disincentives (Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden). Countries 
featuring in-work benefits to top up low wages (Ireland and the UK) have introduced 
changes aimed at minimising the risk of 'poverty traps', such as higher earning 
thresholds and gradual phasing out of benefits. More generally, action to curb high 
marginal effective tax rates has been taken in several countries (such as Denmark, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). Overall tax wedges on labour 
has also been reduced (e.g. in the Netherlands). 
In conclusion, the adjustment of European welfare states to the new demographic 
scenarios is underway, with reforms gradually affecting expenditure dynamics, 
especially in the pension area. The changes that have already been implemented, while 
still not sufficient to arrest expenditure increase, offer some scope for optimism, since 
in many countries public opinion has been prepared to accept substantial changes in 
entitlements. The adjustment to a more competitive economic environment raises 
more difficult problems: while some reforms have improved the incentive structure in 
the pension and health area, much still remains to be done. Several pension schemes 
still provide incentives to retire early. The effects of the reforms in the health care 
sector are far from clear; moreover, the direction of further reforms is still not well 
defined. The incentive problems related to unemployment and other transfers would 
also require substantial improvements in tax-benefit systems. 
4.2 Which new reforms? 
Introducing further reforms to allow European welfare states to cope with new needs 
and constraints raises a number of difficult issues. How far can social expenditure be 
constrained without impairing the main objectives of present policies? Can reforms 
fully offset the effects of ageing on spending or should increases in revenues and cuts 
in other budgetary items also be planned? Which benefits could actually be reduced? 
Should more emphasis be put on systemic reforms or on punctual changes of the 
parameters of the present system (e.g., by tightening eligibility rules and reducing 
transfer ratios)? Should the targeting of benefits on the most needy be revised or the 
welfare state from the middle classes be withdrawn? Should the boundary between the 
responsibility of the state and that of the private sector be shifted? What is the scope 
for privatisation in the financing and the production of social services? 
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Providing answers to these questions goes well beyond the scope of the paper34_ This 
section takes a narrower approach by considering three reform lines that aim at 
reducing the role of the public sector in providing pensions, overcoming the 
inefficiencies of unemployment benefit systems, and improving the incentives 
produced by social protection systems. 
4.2.1 From PAYG to funding - The reform of pension systems, which absorb a large 
share of social protection expenditure and are particularly affected by population 
ageing, is at the core of the adaptation of the welfare state to new economic and 
demographic conditions. It is fundamental for ensuring durable fiscal consolidation 
and for improving the conditions of European labour markets. 
As reported in Section 2.2.1, in spite of these reform efforts, which will partly offset 
the effects of demographic trends, in most countries the preservation of present 
pension benefit levels and eligibility rules will require a substantial increase in the 
national resources devoted to pension systems. Alternatively, the stabilisation of 
pension expenditure will require further severe cuts in pension benefit levels and 
substantial restrictions in pension eligibility. 
The first option raises several problems. Although reforms strengthening the link 
between contributions and benefits might make the burden of contributions more 
tolerable and less distortive, adding 3 to 4 points to the present tax to GDP ratio would 
be extremely difficult for the reasons pointed out at the beginning of Section 4. 
It would also be difficult to compensate the increase in pension expenditure with cuts 
on other expenditure items. The decline in the share of the young to total population 
offers some margins for cutting education expenditure, but health expenditure and 
expenditure for services to the elderly are likely to increase substantially (Franco and 
Munzi, 1997). So, in the end, containment of benefits is likely to be the primary 
instrument for guaranteeing the solvency of P AYG pension systems. This implies a 
scaling down of citizens' expectations and a revision of present objectives. Further 
reforms might involve changes in indexation rules, increases in retirement age, 
reductions in replacement rates, tightening of eligibility criteria (Thomas, 1997). As 
mentioned in Section 4.1, examples of such piecemeal reforms have, in the past, in 
several countries, demonstrated the effectiveness of such measures in slowing down 
pension expenditure dynamics. 
The increasing role o_ffunding - In several countries the relative weight of PA YG and 
funded schemes is changing, with the latter schemes gradually becoming more 
important. While there is a widespread consensus that the role of funded schemes 
should be increased, there are no clear indications about its optimum size (OECD, 
1992b; World Bank, 1994; Davis, 1995). 
Economic considerations point to the desirability of pension systems that include both 
PA YG and funded schemes, since both schemes are subject to different risks and 
returns (F ornero, 1995). PA YG schemes are superior in the alleviation of poverty and 
the provision of insurance against inflation and investment risks. On the other hand, 
they are vulnerable to population ageing and decline in employment. Governments 
may also default promises based on optimistic assumptions. Funded schemes produce 
34 For an analysis of the problems raised by the reform of the French welfare system, see Darnaud ( 1997). 
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lower distortionary effects in the labour market. They may also contribute to the 
development of financial markets (Davis, 1996) and provide workers with higher 
returns to contributions in a situation in which the real interest rate is higher than the 
rate of growth of employment and real wages. On the other hand, they are vulnerable 
to inflation and investment risks and have relatively high administration costs. 
The development of funded schemes does not alone provide a solution to the 
sustainability problems of the PAYG schemes, which can only be ensured through 
further cuts in their benefits. Supplementary funded schemes can, however, facilitate 
the reforms of PAY G schemes by offering to the workers the possibility to 
compensate for the reduction in the replacement rate resulting from the reforms. This 
development will lead to a partial shift of responsibility for retirement income 
provision from the government towards workers and employers. 
As the importance of supplementary pensions increases as a share of total retirement 
income, it is increasingly important for governments to provide a secure environment 
for the efficient operation of supplementary funded schemes (European Commission, 
1997a, 1997b). A regulatory framework that enables pension funds in all countries to 
properly diversify their assets, both domestically and internationally, should enhance 
returns, reduce risks arising from domestic economic cycles and reduce the negative 
impact on asset prices during periods of disinvestment (i.e. when elderly generations 
run down their wealth)35. 
As illustrated in Holzmann (1997), reforms implying a large scale switch from PAYG 
to funding are difficult to implement in the case of developed and mature public 
pension systems such as those prevailing in most EU Member States. In case of such a 
shift, government pension liabilities would become 'explicit', and create a stock and 
flow problem in public finances. The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the 
value of future pension liabilities already accrued by the workforce, which in most EU 
Member States is much higher than conventional public debt (Van den Noord and 
Herd, 1994) 36. ln order to assess the effect of a shift, it is important to examine how 
the deficit would be financed, as well as the timing of the shift. The burden of the 
transition could either fall on the current generation - which would have to pay twice 
through higher taxes, or lower public expenditure in other fields, in order to finance 
outgoing pensions, while having to pay contributions to the new funded scheme - or be 
distributed between current and future generations, through an increase in public 
deficit and debt. Both these solutions raise difficult problems. 
4.2.2 Overcoming the inefficiencies of unemployment benefits - Unemployment 
benefits and assistance pursue efficiency and equity goals. However, as pointed out 
above, problems of incentive (in)compatibility and funding strain may give rise to 
unemployment and poverty traps. When these problems are particularly serious, 
unemployment benefits and transfers, instead of lifting the unemployed or the 
'working poor' out of their disadvantaged status, actually contribute to its persistence. 
35 
36 
Several other problems mised by a larger reliance on supplementary schemes should be carefully examined 
(e.g. protection against fraud, effects on labour mobility, administration costs). 
For a review, see Frnnco (1995), Chand and Jaeger (1996), and Roseveare et al. (1996). 
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The main policy alternatives to current unemployment benefits are the introduction of 
a 'conditional negative income tax' and the replacement of unemployment benefits 
with employment subsidies. 
A conditional negative income tax could achieve higher equity and efficiency than 
unemployment benefits (Snower, 1995). Income redistribution would imply that the 
lowest income brackets would receive transfers, which would gradually give way to 
taxes at higher income levels. The 'conditional' character of the tax would be related, 
as for the current unemployment benefit systems, to evidence of active job search. 
Such a measure could be more effective for equity purposes because it can be argued 
that the income level rather than the employment status is a better criterion for 
redistribution. It could also be more employment-friendly because it discourages less 
job search, as becoming employed at a low wage would lead to a loss of only a 
fraction of the negative income taxes, rather than all the unemployment benefits. More 
generally, a negative income tax may be more appropriate in overcoming the 
inefficiencies generated by credit constraints, which are more closely associated with 
low incomes than with unemployment37. 
Several studies have argued that replacing unemployment benefits with employment 
subsidies would allow the same equity objectives to be pursued, while promoting 
employment38. Two main proposals have been widely discussed in the literature: 
i) 
ii) 
Low-wage employment subsidies or targeted reductions in pay-roll taxes have 
been proposed to tackle the unskilled unemployment problem (see, e.g., Dreze 
and Malinvaud, 1994; Phelps, 1994b and 1996; and Fitoussi, 1996). 
Giving the opportunity to unemployed people, especially the long-term 
unemployed, to use part of their unemployment benefits as employment 
vouchers to the firms available to hire them. Snower (1994a and b, 1996b), who 
first put forward such proposal, dubbed it Benefit-Transfer Programme. 
If these schemes are effective in taking long term unemployed off the dole, the newly 
generated tax revenue and savings in social transfers would reduce their net cost. No 
inflationary pressure would arise from the fall in unemployment because the wage 
discipline exerted by the long-term unemployed is negligible. As in the case of 
unemployment benefits, these schemes would have a built-in stabilisation function. 39 
37 
38 
39 
In a simple numerical exercise, Snower (l 995) finds that a switch from unemployment benefits to a 
negative conditional income tax in the EU would raise the average income of individuals receiving support 
by about 8 per cent and cut the number of unemployed by around 7 per cent. However, as recent reforms of 
benefit systems in EU countries (by foreseeing a gradual withdrawal of benefits) are attenuating the 
inefficiencies pointed out above, the estimated implications of an outright switch to conditional negatiw 
income tax are likely to be biased upwards. 
The economic rationale for employment subsidies is the existence of a gap between social and private 
benefits from an increase in employment of disadvantaged workers in a situation of involuntary 
unemployment. From the point of view of the individual employer, it makes sense to avoid creating jobs for 
which the marginal product falls below (minimum) wage costs. But this calculation does not consider the 
additional benefits that accrue to the economy as a whole from putting to work an unemployed person 
willing to accept a job. The share of payroll taxes out of the minimum wage provides a first approximation 
of the size of the gap (Phelps, 1996, Dreze and Snessens, 1996). 
·111e above proposals have entered the political arena both at EU and national level. The 1993 White Paper 
(European Commission, 1993c) proposed targeted reductions in non-wage labour costs amounting to 1% of 
GDP, financed through a C02 tax. The White Paper also proposed a complementary strategy, aimed at 
raising the demand for labour-intensive services in sectors sheltered from international competition (for 
example, assistance to the elderly, personal and public safety). A further study explored this strategy in 
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The low-wage subsidies and the employment voucher proposals are not mutually 
exclusive4o_ 
However, the above schemes are not without problems (see, inter alia, Nickell and 
Bell, 1995 and Snower, 1996b ). 
i) The increase in employment induced by subsidies should be assessed net of 
deadweight costs Gobseekers that would have been offered a job anyway, given 
the incumbent workers' average propensity to quit and the proportion of 
vacancies filled by the unemployed) and substitution and displacement between 
the target group and incumbent workers (firms substituting one lot of workers 
for another or employment expansion in one set of firms displacing employment 
in other firms). 
ii) If the amount of the subsidy or the 'size' of the voucher is a positive function of 
the duration of period out of work, job search could be discouraged. 
iii) The acceptance of subsidies or vouchers might be less than intended if they are 
perceived by the unemployed and the employers as carrying signalling or stigma 
implications. 
iv) The employment impact depends on the endogenous reaction of wages: for 
employment to increase some part of the subsidy must act to reduce the cost of 
employing marginal workers and not to be passed on entirely to wages.41 
v) By raising the take-home pay and/or the employment rate of low-skilled workers 
relative to that of skilled workers, subsidies reduce the expected private rate of 
return on education and thereby can depress human capital accumulation and 
productivity growth. 
Part of those negative effects can be attenuated through a careful programme design: 
by giving the right to displaced workers to introduce a formal complaint leading to 
withdrawal of benefits; by transforming 'incapacity benefits' into employment 
vouchers - thereby incurring low dead-weight costs - as proposed by Orszag and 
Snower (1996); by foreseeing a not-so-steep temporal profile of subsidies/vouchers to 
40 
41 
more detail, including simulation of possible measures (European Commission, 1996d). More generally, the 
importance of the refonn of tax and benefit systems in the fight against unemployment in Europe was 
retained as a major policy conclusion of the Ecofin report to the European Council in Madrid in December 
1994 (European Commission, 1995d). A number of EU countries have included these policies in their 
employment strategies, though, so far, with programmes of rather limited scale (for example, the Benefit-
Transfer Programme inspired the British Workstart pilot scheme introduced in 1993). 
On the basis of a number of simplitying assumptions, Snower and Phelps ( 1995) estimated that converting 
unemployment benefits into employment vouchers could reduce EU unemployment by as muL:h as 20 per 
cent, or 2 percentage points in percentage of the labour force. They also estimated that, by targeting on low-
paid workers subsidies amounting to 1 per cent of GDP, unemployment could be reduced by 2 additional 
perL:entage points. The results depend on a number of parameters, notably the 'vouL:her effectiveness ratio' 
L:apturing the equivalenL:e between a temporary voucher and a wage reduction of the same amount. for an 
exercise of the same type concerning most OECD wuntries, see Snower (1996b). 
Subsidies produce different results depending on the degree of responsiveness of wages to unemployment. 
This is explicitly rewgnised by Phelps (1996, p. 240) in comparing the American and the European 
situation: "I suppose that the main benefit of wage subsidies in the USA will take the form of higher wage 
rates, with a less important effect on unemployment. The reason is that 'wage rigidity' is relatively small 
there, which means that the wage curve is relatively steep. And the main benefit of the wage subsidies on 
the European wntinent will take the form of lower unemployment rates - more workers demanded at those 
rigid real wages - with little improvement in wage rates. The reason, again, is that wage rigidity is relatively 
great in Europe, so the wage curve is relatively flat". 
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discourage job search postponement; by offering higher subsidies/vouchers to firms 
that use them for training. However, they cannot be completely eliminated. Indeed the 
experience of a number of EU countries that have implemented various forms of 
reductions in pay-roll taxes point to a rather weak net effect on employment42. 
4.2.3 Improving the incentives of welfare state schemes- As pointed out above, many 
of the problems related to the working of social security systems, are unavoidable. 
However, their dimension is surely exacerbated by the structure of present social 
schemes (Orszag and Snower, 1997). Contributions are often loosely related to 
benefits, so that they are largely regarded as a tax; expenditure controls frequently rely 
on administrative constraints rather than on built-in incentives; redistribution and 
insurance features are frequently mixed and insurance schemes are utilised for 
inappropriate distribution objectives. As pointed out by Musgrave (1981), "To 
represent as redistribution what in fact is not is undesirable as a matter of social 
sensibility. Moreover the acceptability for redistribution measures is limited and 
should not be preempted by what in fact is not a part thereof" 
In several countries, proposals have been put forward to redesign social security 
schemes along lines that are less distortive of individuals' choices and more 
transparent in their distributive effects43. Reforms have already been introduced or 
planned along the same lines. The strengthening of the contribution/benefit link is a 
crucial factor. These actions are expected to increase the incentive to work and, more 
specifically, to stay on in regular jobs (since benefits would depend on work record), 
to delay retirement, to move from benefits to work. These effects would reduce the 
demand for benefits and allow a reduction in contribution rates and tax-wedges. By 
making workers more aware of the value of the benefits for which they are paying 
contributions, they may also affect wage negotiations, for if workers are not aware of 
the value of non-wage benefits, they are not likely to trade lower wage increases for 
the continuation of present benefits44. 
In the case of pension schemes, this line of reforms increases the role of actuarial 
principles: this implies shifting PAYG schemes from 'defined-benefits' systems 
(which base pensions on earnings in final period of work) to 'defined-contribution' 
systems (which base pensions on contributions paid over whole working life) and 
increasing the role of funded schemes ( where the contributions-benefits link is 
typically very strong). Some recent pension reforms have been explicitly designed on 
the criteria outlined above: the Swedish and Italian reforms in 1994 and 1995, 
respectively, are going to replace the present wage-related pension with actuarial 
pensions based on life-time contributions and expected life at retirement. Piecemeal 
changes introduced in several countries also strengthened the contribution-benefit link. 
42 
43 
44 
However, in less than perfectly competitive labour markets, the rise in the number of 'employable' workers 
and a higher turnover of incumbents may be beneficial per se: a number of long-term unemployed would be 
brought back into the labour market and newly displaced workers, since they have a better chance to find a 
new job, would exert a more effective wage discipline pressure on insiders. 
See, for instance, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (1994). 
In this respect, the US case, where contributions to company-based health and pension schemes are an 
important part of wage negotiations is particularly relevant. Any increase in health care costs can more 
easily influence wage negotiations .. 
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All encompassing reform proposals of benefit systems with built-in incentives that 
limit the demand for benefits are put forward by Foister (1997) and Orszag and 
Snower (1997). Foister suggests the introduction of 'individual social insurance 
accounts'. In the same vein Orszag and Snower propose the establishment of 'welfare 
accounts' for each citizen covering the four main welfare functions, namely, provision 
for retirement, unemployment compensation, human capital formation and insurance 
against sickness and disability. Mandatory contributions - set in an actuarially fair 
manner and supplemented by a degree of redistribution across individual income 
situations - would be made to each account, and individual withdrawals - subject to 
prudential monthly limits - would replace current pension, unemployment and 
sickness and disability benefits. 
The system would reduce the incentives to stay on benefits and increase the incentive 
to work, as the longer people remained unemployed the lower the net balances on their 
unemployment accounts available for subsequent use. It would allow a reduction in 
contribution rates and bring social security contributions back to their insurance 
origins, i.e. back to the benefit principle (the tax is the price for a specific public 
service or transfer). The scope for the benefit principle would be large, as a very large 
proportion of social transfers (80 % in Sweden) "merely smoothes income over the 
individual's life cycle" (Foister, 1997)45. 
4.3 The implementation of reforms 
As was pointed out at the beginning of this section, European welfare systems are 
undergoing substantial changes. However, even in countries that have experienced the 
so-called 'conservative revolution' of the 1980s (essentially, the UK and US), in spite 
of the widely publicised negative consequences of welfare dependence, there has not 
been a major overhaul of the welfare state. As Snower puts it, "while many 
governments focused less attention on alleviating poverty and unemployment, the 
welfare state services to the middle classes remained virtually untouched. While the 
welfare state withered, the Transfer State bloomed" (Snower, 1994b, p.2). 
Why is it proving so difficult to reform the welfare state? 
First of all, from a political science standpoint, Pierson (1996) stresses the generally 
'conservative' character of democratic political institutions: the welfare state now 
represents the status quo. Hence changing it would require explicit political decisions 
(as opposed to non-decisions, more frequent in such sensitive matters). 
Second, reforms may be hampered by the fact that their costs are felt straightaway, 
while their benefits are more uncertain and accrue in the future (possibly beyond the 
political horizon of policy-makers). With reference to labour market regulations, 
radical reforms may be opposed because there may be more losers than winners (the 
unemployed are still a relatively small minority), the coalition in favour of them is 
politically very heterogeneous (skilled workers, small entrepreneurs, besides the 
unemployed and the inactive) and there is uncertainty on the groups that will actually 
45 Some reforms along these lines have already been introduced in some non-European countries. Individual 
soi;ial insurance ai;wunts have been introdui;ed in Chile (unemployment insurance) and Singapore (medical 
insurance). 
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gain from reforms.46 These 'political economy' considerations - that emphasise the 
pivotal role of the median voter - seem relevant for welfare state provisions at large. 
Third, in the most developed welfare state systems, as economic agents are more 
'tightly linked' than in decentralised market economies, reforms imply greater costs 
because changes in one part alter the efficiency of other parts of the system47. 
While the build-up of the welfare state has occurred through incremental policy 
changes over the years, 'decrementalism' (a gradual rolling back of the frontiers of the 
welfare state) may not be the most effective reform strategy. A number of arguments 
point to the benefits of bundling policy changes in a single, overall package. First of 
all, a global approach would help in exploiting policy complementarities that enhance 
the efficiency gains produced by individual policies (Coe and Snower, 1997).48 
Second, 'decrementalism' may induce 'rule instability' (Lindbeck, 1994b and 1995) 
by leading to uncertainty and expectations of further changes down the road with 
negative consequences on private consumption/saving behaviour. Finally, a 
comprehensive social pact aiming at overcoming the corporatist opposition of 
narrower special interests (Esping-Andersen, 1996) and a global package reform so 
that most voters both lose, on the benefit side, and win, on the tax side (Lindbeck, 
1994a) appear more likely to gather political consensus49. 
5. Conclusions 
Richard Musgrave, in his seminal work on the theory of public finance (Musgrave, 
1959), identified three basic government functions: allocation, redistribution and 
stabilisation. The modern welfare state, especially in its Western European version, 
has played a central role in each one of these functions: by stepping into areas 
characterised by lack of private insurance it helped to correct significant market 
failures; a more equitable resource distribution was pursued through a host of 
mechanisms, both on the revenue and on the expenditure side of the budget; finally, a 
number of these mechanisms - namely unemployment insurance, as well as the large 
tax systems - acted as built-in stabilisers in recessions. 
As this paper has documented, the achievements of the European welfare state are 
impressive: Europe's social fabric is, on the whole, much more cohesive than that of 
the US and, for a long time, a large welfare state has co-existed with rapid economic 
growth. However, important challenges are calling into question such achievements. 
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See Saint-Paul ( 1995a and 1995b) and Alogoskoufis et al. ( 1995 ). 
This seems particularly relevant in the fully fledged Nordic variant of the welfare state: with reference to 
Sweden, there appears to exist a "highly interrelated welfare state and economy in which many parts fit 
together (be they subsidies, taxes, collective bargaining, wage compression, etc.) in ways that maintained 
high employment and wage compression, that offset work disincentives from welfare benefits and high 
taxes, and that ultimately helped eliminate poverty" (Freeman, 1995a, p. 18). 
l lowever, as pointed out above in the case of unemployment benefits and job protection, welfare provisions 
may, in some cases, bt: substitutes instead of complementary. See also Atkinson (1997). 
As Lindbeck points out, "by making sufficiently many decisions simultaneously, it would even be difficult 
to some unemployed workers, it conferred benefits on other finns and other workers, but the beneficiaries 
calculate the distributional consequences of a 'package reform"' (Lindbeck, 1994a, p. 17). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
A number of developments are undermining the role of the welfare state in all three 
government functions: 
a) High marginal effective tax rates distort incentives and hamper the functioning 
of the labour market; they may have a significant role in the scale and 
persistence of European unemployment. 
b) The equity objective is questioned by the presence of a large pool of long-term 
unemployed, who often become permanently de-franchised from the official 
labour market. 
c) Even the stabilisation function is jeopardised as high deficits and debts reduce 
the room for manoeuvre and the anti-cyclical effectiveness of budgetary policy. 
It is likely that, without major changes, such negative aspects would be reinforced in 
the future, as demography and other factors are likely to heighten budgetary 
sustainability and labour market problems. The acceleration of European economic 
and monetary integration also calls for important changes in the current welfare 
systems in order to allow them to continue to pursue their equity and efficiency goals 
in a changing economic environment. 
The process of welfare state reform has started throughout Europe, often motivated by 
the budgetary consolidation objectives of the Maastricht Treaty. In several Member 
States, recent reforms, especially in the pension area, have managed to slow down the 
increase of welfare spending as a share of GDP. On a number of accounts, however, 
the reform process has been unsatisfactory. 
Besides taking still insufficient account of likely future developments and their 
implications in terms of implicit government liabilities, the reforms have often taken 
too long to be implemented. This has increased the cost of transition once the new 
regime has been put into place. 'Political economy' considerations may explain the 
protracted controversies surrounding reforms. They may also explain two other 
shortcomings, namely, the relative penalisation of the worst-off to the advantage of the 
middle classes in the reform of benefits and the insufficient attention to efficiency in 
the production of public services, such as health care. 
What policy lessons can be drawn from the academic and policy debate that has been 
surveyed in this paper? Due to the lack of a country-specific approach, only a number 
of general principles that could underline future reforms can be highlighted: 
a) Maintaining a sustainable fiscal position by adjusting welfare expenditure 
trends - Medium- and long-term expenditure trends should be closely 
monitored. Action should be taken well in advance to avoid pressure on public 
budgets leading to higher tax rates or deficits. More specifically, pension 
reforms should be announced early, so as to allow a gradual implementation; 
sudden changes in rules should be avoided, since they carry large adjustment 
costs as citizens have made their working and saving decisions under pre-reform 
rules. The breathing-space that pension expenditure projections outline for the 
next few years should be used to introduce reforms aimed at cutting benefits 
after the year 2010. 
As future employment and productivity trends are uncertain, so are the resources 
available for financing benefits in the future. Whatever reforms are 
implemented, they should be flexible and allow for adjustments in expenditure 
dynamics. Flexibility should be built in the system with transparent and stable 
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rules. For instance, pension replacement ratios could be automatically adjusted 
to changes in life expectancy, while pension indexation arrangements could take 
imbalances in revenues and benefits trends into consideration. 
b) Strengthening the actuarial elements in the welfare state system - While the 
fundamental redistributive aims of social protection systems should be retained, 
their structure should be re-examined. Assistance functions should be more 
clearly separated from insurance functions. The design of insurance schemes 
should be modified on market-oriented lines, based on a closer link between 
contributions and benefits. At the individual level, the link between 
contributions and benefits should be transparent, easy to grasp and stable over 
time. Therefore, pensions, and, where possible, non-pension benefits, should be 
linked to past contributions by shifting from defined-benefit systems to defined-
contribution systems. The introduction of individual social insurance or welfare 
accounts would substantially strengthen this reform process. All this would have 
favourable effects on incentives, wage settlements and budgetary sustainability 
and would limit the negative effects of contributions and benefits on 
employment. 
c) Building incentive-compatible systems also on the supply side of welfare 
state provisions - Putting into practice the previous point would go a long way 
in improving the incentive-compatibility of the welfare state system. However, 
not only recipients, but also suppliers of welfare state services should have the 
right incentives in optimising available resources. Major improvements can be 
achieved, in particular, in the production of health services. Efficiency gains can 
also be achieved in active labour market policies, such as those aiming at 
improving skills and supporting job search, where 'bureaucratic' performance 
indicators may result in adverse selection ( e.g. by making public employment 
services picking easy-to-place individuals). 
d) Reconsidering social transfer and taxes at the low end of the wage scale -
The economic position of the less skilled has deteriorated in both the US (lower 
relative wages) and Europe (higher relative unemployment). In the European 
setting, if both higher employment rates and minimum socially acceptable 
incomes are deemed equally important objectives, steps should be taken to 
eliminate those features of the transfer and tax system that tend to aggravate the 
situation. Specifically, low wage recipients should not be discriminated against 
by the benefit system relative to the long-term unemployed or to persons which 
are not working. ln tum, taxation should not penalise workers at the low end of 
the productivity scale. 
e) Enhancing human capital formation - Measures to reduce rigidities in the 
labour market, including reduction of wage-compression mechanisms, should be 
coupled with strong action on the improvement of knowledge and skills. A key 
objective should be ensuring that all labour market entrants are equipped with 
basic literacy, numeracy and vocational competence. Achieving a more even 
distribution of human capital is probably the best way to dispel the fear that, 
with higher labour market flexibility, Europe would run into the American 
working-poor syndrome. 
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